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tion of merchants returning to China, or the proofs required are impossible and absurd. We incline very strongly
to the first alternative, adding this proviso : That the
Collector of the Port, as an executive officer, has a right
to demand of returning merchants a reasonable proof that
they are merchants resident in the United States. For
this there can be no more satisfactory method than the one
required by Congress in the case of returning laborers, and
this Lau Ow Bew is in a position to furnish.
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The reader of this valuable work will find it a task of
no little difficulty to give honor where honor is due, for it
represents in text and in notes the learning and literary
skill of both Mr. Williams and Mr. Darlington, while it
contains a considerable number of the notes to the fourth
edition of Williams on Personal Property by the American
editors of that edition, Messrs. Gerhard and Wetherill.
The chapter on "Ships" is by Martin F. Morris, LL.D.,
while Robert G. Dyrenforth, LL.D., contributes the chapter on "Patents, Trade-marks and Copyrights."
It is, in
fact, as Mr. Darlington states in his preface, Williams on
Personal Property minus so much of the original text as.
is inapplicable in the United States, filus a further presentation, upon the latest English and American authorities,
of topics treated in the retained text, together with sundry
subjects of importance not therein discussed. The formula
for determining the authorship of any given passage is thus
stated in the preface: "Every paragraph of the following
140 Fed. Rep., 433.
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pages, with inconsiderable exceptions, the references in
which are exclusively to English authorities, is the unchanged text of Mr. Williams. All paragraphs containing
both English and American citations, or the latter only,
are wholelv new.
The book itself is an admirable summary of the principles of mercantile law and the common law as affecting
personal property. There is,from the nature of the subject, but little logical order in the sequence of topics, but
the internal structure of each chapter is all that could be
,desired. In the chapter entitled "Of Chattels which Descend to the Heir," the summary of the law of fixtures is
admirable. So is the exposition of the doctrine of suretyship, on page 150, while the statement on page 153 of the
difference between a surety and a guarantor could not be
improved upon. The learning on the subject of voluntary
declarations in trust, and the modern development of that
doctrine, are succinctly set forth on page 66. Pennsylvania
lawyers who hesitate to accept the dictum of Judge Woodward in Wallace v,.Harmstead will dissent from Darlington's statement, on page 34, that in allour States "every
real vestige of tenure is," in practical effect, "annihilated." We notice the old classification of personal actions
as ex conracto and ex delicto on page I07-an unhistorical
classification, as Mr. F. W. Maitland demonstrates, but
one which it seems hard to break loose from. The chapter on "Patents and Copyrights," contributed by R. G.
Dyrenforth, is of unusual excellence, and Professor Morris's chapter on "Ships" is accurate and comprehensive.
We note singularly few errors either in typography or
in substance. In Gerhard and Wetherill's note to page
39, in the synopsis of the case of Griffith v. Ingledew (6 S.
& R., 429), there is a statement that the goods shipped
were, according to the bill of lading, to be "delivered to
A reference to the original report
D. or his assigns."
shows that "D." should be "B."
This case, by the way,
is well known to Pennsylvania lawyers on account of the
able opinion of Chief Justice Tilghman, ss well as for the
-vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice Gibson. The latter main-
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tained in opposition to the decision of that of the inajority
that where goods were consigned by A. in Liverpool to B.
in Philadelphia (the shipper not acting as agent of the consignee) the transfer of the property vested an interest in the
contract so as to entitle the consignee to bring suit in his
own name against the carrier for negligence. It is interesting to read in this connection the note by Mr. Justice
Gibson, which is printed on page 439 of the report, in which
he cites the case of Sergeant v. Kovus (3B. & Ald., 377)
as sustaining his position, that decision not having reached
this country at the time his opinion was rendered.
Mr. Darlington's literary style harmonizes well with
that of Mr. Williams, and when this is said no higher
praise can be given it. There are no unpleasant transitions
such as one might expect in a book of composite authorship, and it possesses that which a legal work of reference
may lack, but which a summary must possess-the quality
of readableness. For we take it that the real value of a
summary lies in the fact that the reader may obtain froni
it, not the materials for a brief in a particular case, but a
comprehensive view of that portion of the field of law
which it comprises and may see the subject under discussion in its correlation with other subjects. To this end
the interest must be sustained throughout, for it may be
said that such a book will be read for the sake of reading,
and not merely as a necessary though unpleasant mode of
accomplishing a particular purpose. But while this feature of the book is an element of strength, it is also a source
of weakness. It may be doubted whether Mr. Darlington
is right in ascribing the failure of Williams on Personal
Property to attain in this country equal eminence
with the author's work on Real Property solely to the
amount of space devoted in the former to the discussion of
English statutes: we venture to think that in the case of
personal property students of law in the United States and
the profession generally demand special works on each of
those subjects to which Mr. Williams and Mr. Darlington
can devote but a chapter. For a summary they are still
satisfied with Blackstone and Kent, and when they desire-
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to investigate the law of contracts, of insurance, or of stocks
and shares, they ask for a more detailed exposition than is
possible within the respective limits of twenty-six, four and
twelve pages octavo. In the case of the law of personal
property the student who has made himself master of the
learning contained in a modern edition of Blackstone is
prepared without an intermediate halting-place to begin
the devious journey through an exhaustive treatise on a
given subject. In the law of real property, however, this is
not the case. The student who has read the second book
of Blackstone needs a stepping-stone-a Williams ol Real
Property-before he can make good use of Fearne on Remainders or of Gray on the Rule Against Perpetuities. And
the reason is obvious. The common law has a system
of real property law which comprises an elaborate and
complicated theory of tenure, and an all-pervading doctrine of seisin. This system was developed and refined
and overrefined during a period when real property was
everything, and personal property was, relatively, nothing.
It took such a finn hold on the courts that they even forced
things personal into the mould which had been made for
things real. Thus the vesting of future interests under
limitations of personal property is said by the author last
mentioned to be governed by the canons which apply to
corresponding interests in reality. This great system must
be mastered as a system before particular branches of it can
be approached, and the birds-eye view of Blackstone is not,
as we have already said, sufficient for this purpose. But
the common law has no system of personal property.
There really is no "law of personal property" to write
a book about. There are all those individual subjects
which give titles to Mr. Williams' chapters, but their only
connection is that they are not governed by real property
law. Little or no preliminary study is therefore required,
and any one subject may be attacked forthwith. And when
the plunge is made the student finds that modern law has
lent itself to the development of these particular subjects
as being themselves independent and autonomous divisions
of jurisprudence, and not nere departments of a so-called

